In April, China recorded Copper ore and concentrate imports reaching 2.92 million tons. This has pushed the 12-month total to a peak of 28.8 million tons. Changes over recent years include a rise in the ratio of imports of ore and concentrate compared to unwrought Copper and products, moving from 1.5 times to over five times between 2010 and 2024.

Imports of Copper ore and concentrate grew by over 300% from 2010 to 2024, while unwrought Copper and products only saw a 30% increase. Domestic production of Copper products more than doubled during the same period. Although there was a 24.6% year-on-year increase in April, the 12-month period shows diminishing import growth, now at 2.4% compared to 9% previously.

This slowdown may be linked to the global supply rather than Chinese demand, as supply increased by just 1.8% last year. In 2023, China accounted for about 65% of the global Copper ore and concentrate imports. These figures highlight the continued demand for Copper in China despite external supply challenges.

This data outlines the shape of China’s copper supply chain, and what we’re seeing is a steady structural tilt towards raw input dependency. Specifically, the uptick in ore and concentrate imports, rising far faster than unwrought metal and alloyed products, underscores this shift. Domestic smelting appears to have ramped up to absorb these increased inflows, with local refiners boosting output capacity over the past decade. As a result, refined copper production within China now covers a far greater share of its end-use needs than it did during the early 2010s.

Zhou’s jump in April—nearly 25% year-on-year—draws attention, but looking across a longer stretch, momentum has clearly tapered. A 2.4% rise over the past twelve months, when taken in context with a previous 9% trajectory, shows us a broader easing. We can’t ignore that supply growth in the upstream market, globally, rose by only 1.8% last year. That puts pressure on sourcing decisions, not just from a procurement angle but from a pricing standpoint given what we observe in refining margins.

Li’s 65% figure—China’s share of world ore and concentrate imports—should not be viewed simply as a proportion. It represents a point of strain and dominance wrapped into one. With that level of demand absorption, pricing mechanics may skew depending on bottlenecks in exporting regions. We’re not likely to see runaway premiums unless there’s a sharper-than-expected slowdown in mined supply or a regulatory clamp in any of the major exporting countries. But the current ratio of ore imports to refined copper imports, now over 5:1, reveals a longer-term reallocation of value-add activity within China’s borders.

For positioning within the derivatives space, we should isolate the divergence patterns between refined copper and its raw feed. With such a strong domestic capacity buildout over the past decade, any deviation in treatment and refining charges (TC/RCs) could send swings through futures spreads. These aren’t just signs of cost pressure; they’re reflections of tightness or slack on either side of the production chain. Next few months may give us additional clarity, particularly as mid-year global production figures become available. Supply data out of Latin America should be watched closely—especially in terms of port disruptions or labour issues, which might not surface immediately in mined output numbers but almost always ripple through concentrate flows.

Given that refined output continues to grow and that demand domestically isn’t receding, futures contracts on refined copper may become less sensitive to import volumes and more reactive to refinery utilisation rates. Wu’s comments last week hinted at an inventory draw in bonded warehouses, suggesting refiners are not yet facing material constraints. Still, if concentrate shipment volumes hit even a temporary plateau—say, from weather-related export issues—such draws could tighten spreads further.

We should also resist interpreting April’s year-on-year spike in isolation. It may reflect front-loaded procurement due to anticipated maintenance or political risk in supplier nations. As such, average inflows over the quarter may offer a better reading of sustained demand for inputs. Looking at warehouse inventories and export figures from Peru and Chile over that time frame could shed light on what lies beneath the surface.

In the near term, volatility will likely stem less from domestic demand fluctuations than from gyrations in mined supply. Trade desks would be better served tracking vessel movements and port clearance delays than looking to manufacturing PMI releases alone. While copper consumption growth may have matured, procurement rhythms remain jagged—and that’s where near-term price signals are increasingly located.